

# Labor Mobility and Semi-Presidentialism

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## Abstract

Political scientists frequently argue that presidential and parliamentary democracies produce different policy outcomes but fail to fully consider semi-presidential democracies. To demonstrate the importance of considering semi-presidentialism, I reanalyze an existing argument that presidential democracies have more labor mobility than parliamentary democracies because presidential democracies empower special interests who support immigration. I replicate previous analyses and find little evidence that the type of democracy affects labor mobility. Political scientists need to consider semi-presidentialism or risk erroneous inferences. Further, theories of institutions and immigration policy, and institutional theories more generally, should focus on more specific institutions rather than rely on the blunt distinctions between types of democracies.

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The debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism is among the most studied in political science. Scholars routinely argue that presidential democracies have worse policy outcomes than parliamentary democracies. But such studies routinely ignore semi-presidential democracies. They often receive limited attention both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2009; Persson and Tabellini 2003). To demonstrate the importance of semi-presidential democracy, I reanalyze Bearce and Hart’s (2017) argument that presidential democracies have more labor motility than parliamentary democracies.<sup>1</sup> I incorporate semi-presidentialism and find that the type of democracy—whether presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential—does *not* affect labor mobility. The reanalysis of this one paper demonstrates that political scientists, both in international relations and comparative politics, need to consider semi-presidentialism or risk erroneous inferences.

Bearce and Hart ask why some advanced industrial democracies make immigration easier or harder than others. Public opinion cannot provide the answer. Voters across advanced industrial democracies uniformly oppose increasing immigration (Rosenblum and Cornelius 2012). Even the democratic publics that support immigration the most have far less than majority support (Facchini and Mayda 2009).<sup>2</sup> Instead, institutions are potential explanations. Political institutions shape the relative power of pro-immigration and anti-immigration groups (Abou-Chadi 2016; Breunig and Luedtke 2008). Institutions, by empowering different groups, can produce different immigration policies despite similar underlying public opinion.

Bearce and Hart argue that the type of democracy, whether parliamentary or presidential, is one institution that affects immigration policy. Their logic builds on Grossman and Helpman’s (2001) model of special interest politics. The government is pressured by an electoral channel and a special-interest channel. If policy preferences are divided, the electoral channel favors the group with more members. The smaller group has fewer collective action problems and can more effectively use the special-interest channel (see also Olson 1965; 1982). In the context of immigration, voters, who oppose immigration, are stronger in the electoral channel.

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1. Hereafter, “Bearce and Hart” refers to Bearce and Hart (2017) unless stated otherwise.

2. Individual support for or opposition to immigration, of course, depends on myriad factors, including individuals’ skills and education (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015; Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), skills of potential immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Nuamann, Stoetzer, and Piertratuono 2018), and whether immigrants are already in the country (Margalit and Solodoch 2022). The general tendency is for the broader public to oppose immigration.

Businesses, which support immigration (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011; Freeman 1995; Freeman and Tandler 2012; Money 1997),<sup>3</sup> are stronger in the special-interest channel.

According to Bearce and Hart, presidentialism strengthens the special-interest channel and, therefore, the influence of pro-immigration groups. Under a presidential system, the executive and legislature are elected separately, and the legislature cannot remove the cabinet collectively through a confidence procedure (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Political scientists routinely argue—and find evidence—that presidential democracies are less representative than parliamentary ones and have deleterious policy effects. Presidential democracies, for instance, are associated with a greater likelihood of democratic breakdown (Linz 1990), less government spending (Persson and Tabellini 2003), and lower economic and human development (Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2009).

Bearce and Hart hypothesize that because parliamentarism is more representative, parliamentary democracies will have less external labor openness. When external labor openness is higher, more foreign workers can enter the economy. They test their hypothesis with a novel measurement of external labor openness across 36 countries from, at maximum, 1996 to 2012. They find, as predicted, that parliamentary democracy has a negative and statistically significant effect on external labor openness.

There is, however, a third major form of democracy: Semi-presidentialism. Semi-presidentialism combines core features of presidential and parliamentary democracy. Semi-presidential democracies have a directly-elected president, but the cabinet, headed by a prime minister, is subject to legislative confidence (Duverger 1980; Elgie 2011; Shugart and Carey 1992). Bearce and Hart focus on the difference between presidential and parliamentary. Semi-presidentialism has a limited role in their theory, and in their empirical analysis, they intend to include semi-presidentialism with parliamentarism. They categorize countries with the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; Beck et al. 2001; Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2021), which does not include a semi-presidential category. All countries are either presidential or parliamentary.<sup>4</sup>

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3. Like voters and opposition to immigration, not all businesses support, or actively lobby for, immigration (Peters 2014; 2015). Businesses should support more immigration on average.

4. The DPI includes a third, intermediate category called “assembly-elected presidential”: “Systems are assembly-elected presidential if the president cannot be removed and if the president fulfills the criteria for presidential systems in places with both prime ministers and directly elected presidents” (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2021, codebook, 4). None of the countries in the sample are coded as assembly-elected presidential, and the

The influence of the electoral channel versus special interests is unclear in semi-presidential regimes. Semi-presidentialism two combines core aspects of presidentialism and parliamentarism. On one hand, one view holds that electing the president and parliament separately reduces electoral representation. Political parties need the presidency for political power. Parties are incentivized to nominate candidates who can win national elections rather than candidates who adhere to the party's policies. Once in power, the president can deviate from the party's platform (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Direct national elections allow the president to choose their own policies and ignore the party's electoral promises.

On the other hand, semi-presidential governments need parliamentary confidence. Confidence is the key tool for accountability in parliamentarism (Strøm 2000). Parliament can remove governments that deviate from parliament's preferred policies. While parliament cannot remove the president in semi-presidential systems, parliament can remove the government, forcing the president to appoint a new prime minister and cabinet. Parliament still has tools to influence policy and punish presidents who deviate from parliament's preferred policies. Others categorize semi-presidentialism as parliamentary due to parliamentary confidence (Cheibub 2007; Lijphart 2012).

Semi-presidentialism has mechanisms that can both undermine and strengthen electoral accountability. The dominant influence is not clear. Directly comparing parliamentary to presidential countries will best estimate the desired effect. If the goal is still to classify semi-presidential and presidential countries together, the data must reliably code semi-presidential systems correctly. The DPI does not. The DPI codes nearly all semi-presidential observations in the sample, over 83%, as parliamentary. Using the DPI actually compares non-presidential to presidential systems, not parliamentary to non-parliamentary systems. The remainder of this paper reassess the relationship between types of democracy and labor mobility with an alternative classification that accounts for semi-presidentialism. Accounting for semi-presidentialism, there is little evidence that the type of democracy affects external labor openness.

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definition is distinct from semi-presidentialism.

# 1 Classifying Democratic Regimes


To test the relationship between democratic regime types and labor mobility, the data need to translate the conceptual differences between types into a valid operationalization. Presidential systems have directly elected heads of state, while the government does *not* require parliamentary confidence. Under parliamentarism, the government requires parliamentary confidence to survive, and the head of state is elected indirectly. Semi-presidential combines key features of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The head of state is directly elected, but the government requires parliamentary confidence to persist in office.

In their original analysis, Bearce and Hart use the DPI to classify countries. The DPI only sorts countries into presidential and parliamentary, excluding semi-presidentialism. A country is presidential if the executive is not elected or if there is no prime minister. Otherwise, a country is presidential if the president can veto legislation and the legislature needs a supermajority to override vetoes; *or*, the president can appoint and dismiss the prime minister and other cabinet ministers, *and* the president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections; *or*, sources mention the president more than the prime minister *if* there is no or only ambiguous information on the veto power, the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, and the dissolving of parliament.

The DPI operationalization presents two key problems. First, the DPI sorts types of democracies into only two categories: parliamentary and presidential. Because semi-presidentialism does not exist as a separate category, the relationship between semi-presidentialism and external labor openness cannot be tested because it does not exist as a separate category. The DPI excludes the possibility of a trichotomous analysis.

Second, the DPI does not map the conceptual differences between regimes onto rules for classification. The DPI's operationalization attempts to delineate between the powers and importance of the president versus the prime minister. The balance of power between the president and prime minister, however, does not determine the difference between democratic regimes. Presidents and prime ministers can—and do—co-exist in any democracy. The balance of power between them can vary substantially, particularly in semi-presidential systems. The key variables that separate types of democracy are how the head of state gains power and how the

Figure 1. Classification of Democratic Regimes



*Notes:* The first number is the number of country-year observations in each categorization. The second is the proportion of country-year observations in each category. The percentages do not add exactly to 100% due to rounding. The calculations include any observation with data for external labor openness and a lag for external labor openness.

government retains power.

I use the classification from the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) dataset. The DD criteria classify democracies based primarily on how the government survives. If the cabinet is *not* collectively responsible to the legislature, the country is presidential. If the cabinet is collectively responsible to the legislature and the head of state is *not* directly elected to fixed terms, the country is parliamentary. If the cabinet is collectively responsible to the legislature and the head of state is directly elected to fixed terms, the country is semi-presidential (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Figure 1 summarizes the DD classification scheme along with the number and proportion of country-year observations in each category.

Most categorizations come directly from the DD dataset. I code countries myself in two cases. First, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) do not code democratic regimes for countries that they code as dictatorships. In the sample, Mexico before 2000 and Russia are dictatorships. Mexico's constitution did not change after democratization. I code Mexico as presidential before 2000, following Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's post-2000 coding. Applying the DD criteria, I code Russia as semi-presidential. The Russian constitution allows the legislature to remove the prime minister and cabinet in a single vote (White 1999).

Second, the DD data stop in 2008. To extend the data to 2012, I start by assuming that the type of democracy is the same as in 2012. I check for changes in constitutions using the

Table 1. Cross-Tabulation of DPI and DD Classifications

DD Classification	DPI Classification		
	Parliamentary	Presidential	Total
Parliamentary	289 (99.3%)	2 (0.7%)	291 (100%)
Presidential	16 (24.6%)	49 (75.4%)	65 (100%)
Semi-Presidential	119 (83.2%)	24 (16.8%)	143 (100%)
Total	424 (85%)	75 (15%)	499 (100%)

Percentage of row total in parentheses. The calculations include any observation with data for external labor openness and a lag for external labor openness.

Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014) and Constitute (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, n.d.). I did not identify any constitutional amendments in the sample countries that changed the form of government from 2009 to 2012.<sup>5</sup> As an additional check, I cross-reference all my codings—those not available from the DD data—with Elgie (2018). My codings are all the same as Elgie’s.

Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation of the DPI and DD classifications for all observations with data on external labor openness.<sup>6</sup> A substantial proportion of the sample, 28.6%, is semi-presidential according to the DD classification; in fact, semi-presidential countries outnumber pure presidential countries. In total, nearly a third of the sample (32.26%) of the sample is re-coded. Overwhelmingly, the re-coded cases change from parliamentary or presidential to semi-presidential. A total of 119 (73.91% of the re-coded cases) move from parliamentary to semi-presidential: Austria, Bulgaria (2002–11), Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal,<sup>7</sup> and Slovakia (1999–2011). An additional 24 (14.91%) presidential countries are re-coded as semi-presidential: Bulgaria (1996–2001), Poland, Romania, and Russia.

Estonia and Switzerland account for the remaining cases. Estonia changes from presidential to parliamentary. The DPI codes Estonia as presidential because the balance of power is ambiguous and the consulted sources mention the president more than the prime minister (Cruz,

5. In 2007, Turkey adopted constitutional reforms introducing direct election of the president. Direct election would change Turkey from parliamentary to semi-presidential, but the first direct election did not occur until 2014.

6. Table A1 in the supplementary materials lists every country in the sample with their regime types by each classification.

7. In the most recent version of the DPI, Portugal is coded as presidential, not parliamentary. Portugal’s coding as presidential does *not* change Bearce and Hart’s original results nor the results presented in this paper.

Keefer, and Scartascini 2021, codebook, 4). In Estonia, the president is chosen either by the legislature or an indirectly-elected electoral college. The legislature has the power to remove the entire cabinet collectively. Under the DD criteria, Estonia is parliamentary.

Switzerland switches from parliamentary to presidential. Switzerland is unique among modern democracies; both Ganghof (2021) and Lijphart (2012) code Switzerland in its own category. Switzerland has a seven-personal collegial executive called the Federal Council. The presidency rotates annually among councillors. The president has no additional powers except to break ties (Church 2004; Metcalf 2000). The legislature elects the Federal Council to fixed terms and *cannot* remove the council before the term ends. Switzerland even lacks an impeachment or related process to remove individual councilors. The absence of legislative confidence qualifies Switzerland as presidential even though the chief executive is chosen indirectly.<sup>8</sup>

Even if the relevant comparison is between parliamentary and non-parliamentary democracies, the DPI still presents a problem for the analysis. The mismatch between the conceptualization of democratic types and the DPI's classification rules creates measurement error where semi-presidential countries are classified as parliamentary. A supermajority of semi-presidential countries, 83.2%, are classified as parliamentary according to the DPI, not presidential. While the intended comparison is parliamentary versus non-parliamentary, the actual comparison is closer to presidential versus non-presidential.

The DD classification, consequently, has two advantages over the DPI. DD allows for analyzing semi-presidentialism separately, which the DPI cannot. DD's operationalization also follows most closely from the conceptual differences between regime types. As a result, DD can better categorize semi-presidential and presidential regimes together whereas the the DPI classifies most semi-presidential countries as parliamentary.

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8. Because Switzerland is such a unique case, it might be more appropriate to exclude Switzerland entirely. Table C2 re-runs the main analyses without Switzerland. The results are largely the same except that one additional parliamentary coefficient is significant at 90%. Most institutional coefficients are insignificant when using the DD classification.



## 2 Research Design

To evaluate whether the type of democracy affects external labor openness accounting for semi-presidentialism, I replicate Bearce and Heart’s empirical analysis. The main independent variable is the type of democracy. The sample is exactly the same as Bearce and Hart’s, using the same set of countries across the same time period. I compare the dichotomous classification from the DPI to both a dichotomous parliamentary versus no-parliamentary classification and a trichotomous classification from DD. I retain as much of their empirical strategy as possible to increase confidence that any different results come from the introduction of semi-presidentialism. The initial empirical model is identical to Bearce and Hart’s specifications. The model takes the form.

$$\text{Labor}_{c,t} = \beta \text{Parliament}_{c,t-1} + \delta \text{Labor}_{c,t-1} + \tau' \mathbf{Controls}_{c,t-1} + \theta_c + \varepsilon_{c,t}. \quad (1)$$

Labor is the external labor openness index, Parliament is a dummy variable for parliamentary democracies, and **Controls** is a vector of controls.  $c$  indexes countries and  $t$  years.  $\theta$  represents country fixed effects, and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term. All models, following Bearce and Hart’s analysis, have robust standard errors clustered by country. According to Bearce and Hart’s argument,  $\beta < 0$ . Because the specification includes country fixed effects,  $\beta$  is the effect of a country changing from either presidentialism or semi-presidentialism to a parliamentarism (Mummolo and Peterson 2018).<sup>9</sup>

Next, I need to separate presidential and semi-presidential democracies. I use one argument to develop a hypothesis for semi-presidentialism, but the expectation is clearest between parliamentary and presidential democracies. The simplest solution is adding a dummy variable for semi-presidential democracies to equation (1). Such a model cannot be estimated due to perfect multicollinearity. All the within-country variation is between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. No presidential country changes the type of democracy in the sample, so

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9. Equation (1) suffers from Nickell (1981) bias because it combines fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable. Nickell bias could attenuate the coefficient estimates as Bearce and Hart argue. But Nickell bias, here, also inflates the test statistics because the number of countries exceeds the number of years (Alvarez and Arellano 2003; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul 2014). Whether Nickell bias increases the probability of type I or type II errors is not clear in this case.

Table 2. Countries by United Nations Geoscheme Region

Region	Countries	Country-Years	Proportion	
Australia & New Zealand	2	28	5.61%	Australia, New Zealand
Central America	1	16	3.21%	Mexico
Eastern Asia	2	32	6.41%	Japan, South Korea
Eastern Europe	7	98	19.64%	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia
Northern America	2	32	6.41%	Canada, United States of America
Northern Europe	7	98	19.64%	Denmark, Estonia Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom
South America	1	1	0.2%	Chile
Southern Europe	5	67	13.43%	Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain
Western Asia	2	15	3.006%	Israel, Turkey
Western Europe	7	112	22.44%	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland

The calculations include any observation with data for external labor openness and a lag for external labor openness.

the model cannot be estimated.

I follow Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2009) and use regional fixed effects instead. I classify countries using the United Nations geoscheme, summarized in table 2.<sup>10</sup> The first empirical model with regional fixed effects is

$$\text{Labor}_{c,t} = \beta \text{Parliament}_{c,t-1} + \delta \text{Labor}_{c,t-1} + \tau' \mathbf{Controls}_{c,t-1} + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_{c,t}, \quad (2)$$

where  $r$  indexes regions and  $\gamma$  represents region fixed effects. Equation (2) is identical to equation (1) except that equation (2) has regional fixed effects instead of country fixed effects.  $\beta$  still represents the within-country effect of parliamentarism on external labor openness in comparison to all non-parliamentary regimes. The second regional fixed effects model takes the form

$$\text{Labor}_{c,t} = \beta \text{Parliament}_{c,t-1} + \alpha \text{Semi}_{c,t-1} + \delta \text{Labor}_{c,t-1} + \tau' \mathbf{Controls}_{c,t-1} + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_{c,t}, \quad (3)$$

where Semi is a dummy variable for semi-presidential democracies. Now,  $\beta$  is the within-country effect of parliamentarism on external labor openness relative to presidentialism.  $\alpha$  is the within-country effect of parliamentarism on external labor openness to relative to semi-presidentialism.

In all the models, I calculate the long-run multiplier (LRM) for the parliamentary variable. All the independent variables have effects that can persist across multiple periods because the

10. Slovenia is sometimes grouped with Eastern Europe, rather than Southern Europe. Table C1 replicates the regional effects results with Slovenia coded as Eastern Europe. Coding Slovenia as Eastern Europe does *not* affect the results.

models include a lagged dependent variable. The LRM, calculated  $\frac{\beta}{1-\delta}$ , represents the total effect of parliamentary democracy on external labor openness over time (De Boef and Keele 2008). I calculate the significance of the LRM with the delta method.<sup>11</sup> Bearce and Hart present the LRM for select models. I calculate the LRM for every model and statistical significance using the delta method to ensure that the hypotheses are properly tested. Including the LRMs helps ensure that the effect is not being underestimated, particularly if the replications produce null results.

The dependent variable is Bearce and Hart's original measurement of external labor openness. Their index measures changes in immigration policy, or "policies that affect the number of foreign workers able to enter into the national economy" (66). The index captures immigration policy changes along foreign dimensions: numerical quotas, labor market tests and point-based systems, transaction costs, and other policy areas. In a given year, the index increases by 1 for each policy change in any dimension that increases the number of foreign workers able to enter the economy. The index decreases by 1 for each policy change in any dimension that decreases the number of foreign workers able to enter the economy. The index, in this sample, ranges from -3 (Mexico in 2011–12) to 7 (Norway and South Korea in 2010–12) where higher values indicate fewer restrictions or more openness.

In a set of basic bivariate comparisons, incorporating semi-presidentialism already weakens the evidence that the type of democracy affects labor mobility. Table 3 displays the average level of external labor openness by the type of democracy along with the difference between each regime type and the level of statistical significance. With the DPI classification, there is a significant difference in external labor openness between parliamentary and presidential democracies. With the DD classification, all three pairwise differences are insignificant, and the three categories are jointly insignificant.

All models use the same set of controls as Bearce and Hart from the same sources of data. Data for the control variables are sourced directly from Bearce and Hart's replication data.<sup>12</sup> The control variables are mean district magnitude,<sup>13</sup> and whether the executive is left wing or

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11. More advanced methods have been developed for calculating long-run effects (e.g., Philips 2018; Webb, Linn, and Lebo 2020). But current methods are designed for single time series.

12. Bearce and Hart's replication data are available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000266>.

13. If there are multiple chambers in the legislature, the mean district magnitude for the lower house is used.

Table 3. Average Level of External Labor Openness by Regime Type

	DPI		DD	
	N	Mean	N	Mean
Parliamentary	453	0.99 (0.09)	Parliamentary	312 1.06 (0.12)
Presidential	82	1.85 (0.27)	Presidential	70 1.39 (0.31)
Combined	535	1.12 (0.09)	Semi-Presidential	153 1.12 (0.15)
Parl. – Pres.		-0.86*** (0.25)	Combined	535 1.12 (0.09)
			Parl. – Pres.	-0.32 (0.28)
			Parl. – Semi.	-0.06 (0.19)
			Semi. – Pres.	-0.26 (0.31)
			Joint <i>F</i> -Test	0.69

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Standard errors in parentheses. The DPI categorization is dichotomous. The DD categorization is trichotomous. The joint *F*-test is the *F*-statistic for the joint significance of all three DD categories. All observations with data on external labor openness are included.

right wing from the DPI;<sup>14</sup> population and logged GDP per capita from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators;<sup>15</sup> Polity score from Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2014); and proportion of votes received by far-right parties.<sup>16</sup> For each combination of institutional variables and fixed effects, I estimate two specifications. I estimate a baseline specification that only includes the institutional variables, the lagged dependent variable, and fixed effects, and a full specification with all controls. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables.

### 3 Results

Table 5 shows the model estimates with country fixed effects. Models (1) and (2) use the DPI classification, the same as Bearce and Hart, so model (2) is an exact replication of Bearce and Hart’s model 5.4 (84). Parliamentary democracy, as Bearce and Hart found, has a negative effect on external labor openness. If a presidential or semi-presidential democracy

14. Centrist governments are the reference category.

15. I present population in millions to clarify the coefficient estimates. My scaling is different from Bearce and Hart. The coefficients give the same effect but at different scales.

16. Bearce and Hart calculate the vote share of parties identified as radical right by Norris (2005).

Table 4. Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Q1	Median	Q3	Max
External Labor Openness	499	1.08	2.04	-3	0	1	2	7
Parliamentary (DPI)	499	0.85	0.36	0	1	1	1	1
Parliamentary (DD)	499	0.58	0.49	0	0	1	1	1
Semi-Presidential (DD)	499	0.29	0.45	0	0	0	1	1
Mean District Magnitude	499	16.33	39.11	0.9	2.1	8.6	13.63	450
Population (in Millions)	499	38.29	56.62	0.41	7.48	10.99	56.88	311.59
Polity Score	499	9.54	0.95	4	10	10	10	10
Logged GDP per Capita	499	9.95	0.87	6.97	9.45	10.15	10.56	11.65
Left-Wing Executive	499	0.4	0.49	0	0	0	1	1
Right-Wing Executive	499	0.36	0.48	0	0	0	1	1
Far-Right Vote Share	499	4.65	7.78	0	0	0	8	40.9

The calculations include any observation with data for external labor openness and a lag for external labor openness.

changes to a parliamentary democracy, the country is expected to introduce one-fifth to two-fifths of an additional restrictive policy. The effect is also significant long term. A change to parliamentarism is associated with approximately an additional 1.5 restrictive policies over time.

Models (3) and (4) use the DD categorization split into parliamentary and non-parliamentary. Because no presidential country experiences another regime type in the sample time frame, a model with the trichotomous classification cannot be estimated with country fixed effects. The baseline results are almost identical with the results with the DPI categories. The effects and significance are the same, if not stronger. Including controls immediately changes the conclusion. The effect sizes decrease, and neither the coefficient nor the LRM is significant. Including semi-presidentialism weakens the evidence that the type of democracy affects external labor openness. But the results are far from definitive.

Table 6 replaces the country fixed effects with regional fixed effects. Using regional fixed effects allows for separating semi-presidential democracies into their own category. As before, models (1) and (2) replicate the results with the DPI categories that Bearce and Hart use. Both coefficient estimates are statistically significant and of similar magnitude. The LRMs are both significant and substantively larger than with country fixed effects. Over time, parliamentarism is associated with 3.5 to four additional restrictive policies, two more policies than the country fixed effects models. Changing to regional fixed effects provides a valid comparison. The

Table 5. Country Fixed Effects Models of External Labor Openness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Parliamentary (DPI) $_{t-1}$	-0.226*** (0.060)	-0.374** (0.156)		
Parliamentary (DD) $_{t-1}$			-0.278*** (0.017)	-0.142 (0.110)
External Labor Openness $_{t-1}$	0.846*** (0.021)	0.788*** (0.030)	0.844*** (0.020)	0.787*** (0.030)
Mean District Magnitude $_{t-1}$		-0.009*** (0.003)		-0.010*** (0.003)
Population (in Millions) $_{t-1}$		-0.008* (0.005)		-0.007 (0.004)
Polity Score $_{t-1}$		-0.020 (0.036)		-0.040 (0.039)
Logged GDP per Capita $_{t-1}$		0.387*** (0.095)		0.366*** (0.101)
Left-Wing Executive $_{t-1}$		0.138 (0.151)		0.160 (0.149)
Right-Wing Executive $_{t-1}$		0.166 (0.164)		0.196 (0.156)
Far-Right Vote Share $_{t-1}$		-0.001 (0.010)		-0.002 (0.010)
LRM	-1.474**	-1.767*	-1.783***	-0.664
N	499	499	499	499
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.792	0.803	0.792	0.802
Adjusted Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.791	0.799	0.791	0.798

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include country fixed effects and 36 countries from 1996 to 2011. Models (1) and (2) use the dichotomous DPI coding of parliamentary vs. non-parliamentary regimes. Models (3) and (4) use the dichotomous DD coding of parliamentary vs. non-parliamentary regimes. Because no presidential country in the sample changes regime type in the DD coding, a trichotomous model including a dummy for semi-presidentialism cannot be estimated. LRM is the long-run multiplier for the corresponding parliamentary variable.

results with the DPI are the same and perhaps even stronger.

Models (3) to (6) use the DD categorization. Now, the contrast is stark. Models (3) and (4), again, compare parliamentary democracies to non-parliamentary democracies, putting presidential and semi-presidential democracies together. The coefficients are cut in half and are insignificant. The LRM is significant in model (4) with all the controls although the coefficient is not.

Models (5) and (6) move to a trichotomous categorization. Semi-presidentialism is its own variable, and presidential is the reference category. Both the coefficients have small mag-

Table 6. Regional Fixed Effects Models of External Labor Openness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Parliamentary (DPI) <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.212*** (0.070)	-0.263*** (0.046)				
Parliamentary (DD) <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.045 (0.062)	-0.107 (0.071)	0.056 (0.085)	-0.059 (0.086)
Semi-Presidentialism (DD) <sub>t-1</sub>					0.136 (0.107)	0.060 (0.102)
External Labor Openness <sub>t-1</sub>	0.941*** (0.018)	0.934*** (0.023)	0.947*** (0.016)	0.939*** (0.021)	0.945*** (0.016)	0.938*** (0.020)
Mean District Magnitude <sub>t-1</sub>		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)
Population (in Millions) <sub>t-1</sub>		-0.001** (0.000)		-0.001 (0.000)		-0.001 (0.000)
Polity Score <sub>t-1</sub>		-0.042 (0.034)		-0.061 (0.037)		-0.063 (0.040)
Logged GDP per Capita <sub>t-1</sub>		0.034 (0.085)		0.038 (0.095)		0.041 (0.095)
Left-Wing Executive <sub>t-1</sub>		0.163 (0.099)		0.193* (0.107)		0.184 (0.110)
Right-Wing Executive <sub>t-1</sub>		0.168* (0.096)		0.200* (0.104)		0.190* (0.108)
Far-Right Vote Share <sub>t-1</sub>		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.005)
LRM	-3.575**	-3.995***	-0.849	-1.747*	1.005	-0.938
N	499	499	499	499	499	499
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.891	0.893	0.89	0.892	0.89	0.892
Adjusted Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.89	0.891	0.889	0.89	0.89	0.89
Parl. = Semi.					0.88	1.1

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include regional fixed effects and 36 countries across 10 regions from 1996 to 2011. Models (1) and (2) use the dichotomous DPI coding of parliamentary vs. non-parliamentary regimes. Models (3) and (4) use the dichotomous DD coding of parliamentary vs. non-parliamentary regimes. Models (5) and (6) use the trichotomous DD coding of parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential regimes with presidential regimes as the reference category. Parl. = Semi. is the  $F$ -statistic for the joint significance of the parliamentary and semi-presidential coefficients. LRM is the long-run multiplier for the corresponding parliamentary variable.

nitudes, and the coefficients and LRMs are insignificant. In model (5), the baseline model, parliamentary democracy has a *positive* coefficient and LRM, contradicting the expected effect although the effect is insignificant. I use an  $F$ -test to evaluate whether the difference is significant. The difference is insignificant in both models, so there type of democracy does not appear to have an effect in any direction.

Combining fixed effects with an institutional treatment has potential problems for the analysis. Fixed effects remove all between-unit variation, so the results depend on within-unit variation (Mummolo and Peterson 2018). Institutions rarely change within countries; consequently, using fixed effects may leave little variation in the treatment. In the supplementary

material, appendix B provides additional information on the fixed effects, including summary statistics accounting for country fixed effects (table B1) and regional fixed effects (table B2) and within-unit variation in the treatment by country (table B3) and region (table B4). There is minimal within-country variation. Only Bulgaria has different regime types for the DPI classification, and only Slovakia does for the DD. Table B5 runs the main analyses without any fixed effects. Without any fixed effects, only one coefficient of six is statistically significant at a 90% confidence level. The evidence for a relationship is even weaker without fixed effects regardless of the regime classification.

The results suggest a clear conclusion. The evidence that parliamentary democracies have less external openness is, at best, minimal accounting for semi-presidentialism. Of the six models that account for semi-presidentialism, only one has a negative and significant coefficient. I also include LRMs to ensure that I do not underestimate the effects. Only two of the six models had negative and significant LRMs. The three major types of democracy—parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential—do not appear to affect external labor openness.

## **4 Conclusion**

Advanced industrial democracies have varied immigration policies even though public opinion is similar across countries. Voters in advanced industrial democracies oppose increasing immigration. Institutions provide a potential explanation for variation in immigration policy. Institutions shape the power of groups that support and oppose immigration. Institutional structures that favor voters will empower opposition to immigration. If institutions give greater power to special interests, pro-immigration forces have increased influence.

Bearce and Hart argue that the difference between presidential and parliamentary democracy causes variation in immigration policy. A long line of research in political science argues that presidential democracies are less representative. If they are less representative, the electoral channel is weaker. Special interests have more power to influence immigration policy. They hypothesize that parliamentary democracies will have less external labor openness. They find support for their argument using a novel measurement of external labor openness.



Semi-presidential democracies need to be considered. In Bearce and Hart's analysis, semi-presidential democracies are mixed across parliamentary and presidential democracies. I replicate their results accounting for semi-presidentialism. I find little evidence that the type of democracy affects external labor openness. The original results are partially driven by the misclassification of semi-presidential systems.

For studies of immigration policy, the immediate implication is that the type of democracy does not affect labor mobility. Institutions could still affect immigration policy, of course. But scholars should focus on more specific institutions. The same conclusion applies to the broader work comparing presidential and parliamentary democracies—research abundant in international relations and comparative politics. Despite the abundance of arguments contrasting democratic systems (see Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2009), the main variable of analysis remains whether a country is parliamentary or presidential.

The lack of relationship may have a simple explanation. Parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential democracies are blunt distinctions. They tell us about how governments survive and, except in rare cases, how they are elected. Otherwise, their information is limited. The type of democracy has little correlation with other institutional features of democracy like executive vetoes and decree powers or legislative oversight of the cabinet (Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg 2014). All democracies face a tension between special interests and voters. How governments gain and retain office alone does not resolve this tension. Semi-presidentialism and its proliferation expose this problem by combining the core traits of presidentialism and parliamentarism.

A more fruitful path forward could move beyond blunt distinctions of regime types. Researchers could consider what specific institutions affect immigration policy. This exists to a limited extent. The type of electoral system—majoritarian or proportional—has also received attention. Proportional representation encourages policies and goods that appeal to broader interests whereas majoritarian electoral systems encourage policies that appeal to narrower groups and special interests (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Bearce and Hart themselves extend electoral system arguments to immigration. They argue that proportional representation leads to lower external labor openness. Here, the evidence is encouraging but mixed. Regardless of

the regime classification, district magnitude has a negative and significant effect using country fixed effects or without any fixed effects. District magnitude, however, has a null effect with regional fixed effects. There is some support that proportional representation reduces labor mobility but further empirical analysis is needed.

One, researchers could look at what institutions shape the salience of immigration policy. Voters across developed democracies may oppose immigration, but voters can vary in importance that they assign to immigration policy. Determinants of immigration-policy salience could include institutional factors like electoral systems and party systems that empower immigration-focused parties to non-institutional factors like migration pressure. Second, research could look beyond executive-legislative relations to judicial politics. The judiciary influences immigration policy across developed democracies. Judicial institutions serve a counter-majoritarian role. Stronger judiciaries may block voters' preferred policies for stricter migration.

The limitations of democratic types for explaining immigration policy likely extend to other outcomes. Ultimately, considering more specific institutions is both theoretically richer and empirically valuable. The type of democracy has very little variation within countries over time. Specific institutions can vary even as the type of democracy stays constant. Institutions should affect immigration policy in democracies, but we need to be more specific than the type of democracy.

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